



Legislature v. Eu, 
_U.S._, Nos. 91-1113, 
91-1114 (Mar. 9, 1992). 
Court Allows Legislative Term Limits 
of Proposition 140 to Stand 
On March 9, the U.S. Supreme Court 
denied the California legislature's petition 
for writ of certiorari seeking review of the 
California Supreme Court's ruling 
upholding Proposition 140, the "Political 
Reform Act of 1990" enacted at the 
November 1990 general election. In its 
petition, the legislature argued that 
Proposition 140-which restricts retire-
ment benefits, limits state-financed in-
cumbent staff and support services, and 
places limits upon the number of terms 
which may be served-"steals from every 
citizen the right to vote for the candidate 
of his or her choice." However, that issue 
was fully addressed by the California 
Supreme Court in its decision, which now 
stands as law. In that decision, the court 
acknowledged that Proposition 140 af-
fects the rights of voters and candidates, 
but found that several mitigating factors 
exist and concluded that "the interests of 
the state in incumbency reform outweigh 
any injury to incumbent office holders and 
those who would vote for them" and that 
"the legitimate and compelling interests 
set forth in the measure outweigh the nar-
rower interests of petitioner legislature 
and the constituents who wish to per-
petuate their incumbency." [ 12: 1 CRLR 
196-97] 
Yee v. City of Escondido, 
_U.S._, 92 D.A.R. 4358, 
No. 90-1947 (Apr. 1, 1992). 
Rent Control Law for Mobilehome Parks 
ls Not an Unlawful Fifth Amendment 
Taking 
In this proceeding, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reviewed the California 
Mobilehome Residency Law (Civil Code 
section 798 et seq.), which limits the bases 
upon which a mobilehome park owner 
may terminate a mobilehome owner's 
tenancy and generally prohibits a park 
owner from requiring the removal of a 
mobilehome when it is sold, and the City 
of Escondido's rent control ordinance, 
which set mobilehome rents back to their 
1986 levels and prohibits rent increases 
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without the City Council's approval. 
Petitioners, mobilehome park owners, 
challenged the constitutionality of the or-
dinance, stating that it effected a physical 
taking by depriving park owners of all use 
and occupancy of their property and grant-
ing to their tenants, and their tenants' suc-
cessors, the right to physically permanent-
ly occupy and use the property. Basing 
their argument on the unusual economic 
relationship between park owners and 
mobilehome owners and noting that park 
owners may no longer set rents or decide 
who their tenants will be, petitioners ar-
gued that any reduction in the rent for a 
mobilehome pad causes a corresponding 
increase in the value of a mobilehome, as 
the mobilehome owner now owns (in ad-
dition to a mobilehome) the right to oc-
cupy a pad at a rent below the value that 
would be set by a free market. 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment provides that private proper-
ty shall not be taken for public use without 
just compensation. The Court noted that 
where the government authorizes a physi-
cal occupation of property (or actually 
takes title), the Takings Clause generally 
requires compensation. However, "where 
the government merely regulates the use 
of property, compensation is required only 
if considerations such as the purpose of 
the regulation or the extent to which it 
deprives the owner of the economic use of 
the property suggest that the regulation 
has unfairly singled out the property 
owner to bear a burden that should be 
borne by the public as a whole." In other 
words, the Takings Clause requires com-
pensation if the government authorizes a 
compelled physical invasion of property 
or requires a landowner to submit to the 
physical occupation of his/her land. 
According to the Court, the state and 
local laws at issue in this proceeding mere-
ly regulate petitioners' use of their land by 
regulating the relationship between 
landlord and tenant. Further, the Court 
noted that petitioners voluntarily rented 
their land to mobilehome owners; neither 
the city ordinance nor the state law com-
pels petitioners, once they have rented 
their property to tenants, to continue doing 
so. "Put bluntly, no government has re-
quired any physical invasion of 
petitioners' property." Although agreeing 
that the rent control ordinance transfers 
wealth from park owners to incumbent 
mobilehome owners, the Court noted that 
"the existence of the transfer in itself does 
not convert regulation into physical in-
vasion." 
Although noting that petitioners' 
original complaint and subsequent brief-
ing could be read either to argue a 
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regulatory taking or to support a physical 
taking argument, the Court refused to con-
sider whether or not the ordinance effects 
a regulatory taking, stating that petitioners 
failed to present that question in their peti-
tion for writ of certiorari. Although noting 
that "'[t]he statement of any question 
presented [in a petition] will be deemed to 
comprise every subsidiary question fairly 
included therein,"' and finding that 
whether the ordinance effects a regulatory 
taking is a question related to the one 
petitioners presented, and perhaps com-
plementary to the one petitioners 
presented, the Court held that it is not 
"fairly included therein." In so doing, the 
Court stated that it is leaving "the 
regulatory taking issue for the California 
courts to address in the first instance." 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Service Employees International 
Union, et al. v. 
Fair Political Practices Commission, 
955 F.2d 1312, Nos. 89-15771, 
90-16200, 90-16372 (Feb. 7, 1992). 
Proposition 73 Unlawfully Discriminates 
Against Challengers for Office 
The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has affirmed a district court's 
decision striking down the contribution 
limits applicable to all campaigns for elec-
tion to state and local office established in 
Proposition 73, passed by the voters in 
June 1988. [ 10:4 CRLR 189] Initially, the 
court found "ample evidentiary support" 
for the district court's finding that 
Proposition 73's fiscal year contribution 
limits discriminate against challengers as 
a class; that support was derived from the 
testimony of two expert witnesses, who 
opined that fundraising in the non-election 
years is primarily an incumbent activity. 
The court then considered whether the 
viewpoint and content neutral contribu-
tion limits which discriminate against 
challengers and their supporters are un-
constitutional, noting that in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 
S.Ct. 1391 (1990), the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated that when a statute regulating 
political campaigns discriminates against 
a class of participants in the political 
process, the discrimination must be inde-
pendently justified, even where the statute 
is viewpoint and content neutral. The 
court then rejected appellants' argument 
that Proposition 73's contribution limits 
serve a compelling governmental interest 
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in preventing corruption and the ap-
pearance of corruption. Although ac-
knowledging that the state has a legitimate 
interest in preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption, the court held 
that "this interest will not support a dis-
criminatory formula for limiting contribu-
tions." 
Similarly, the court held invalid 
Proposition 73's ban on intra-candidate 
transfers, its ban on inter-candidate trans-
fers, and its prohibition on the expenditure 
of funds raised prior to January 1989. 
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Allenby, 
958 F.2d 941, No. 90-16485 
(Mar. 11, 1992). 
Consumer Product Warning 
Requirements Are Not Preempted 
Under Federal Laws 
The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has determined that Proposition 65 
(the Safe Drinking Water and Toxics En-
forcement Act of 1986), which among 
other things requires that manufacturers of 
products containing substances listed by 
the state as being carcinogenic or 
reproductively toxic provide adequate 
warnings to the consuming public that 
their products pose a health risk, is not 
preempted by the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 
7 U.S.C. sections 136-136y, and the 
Federal Hazardous Substances Act 
(FHSA), 15 U.S.C. sections 1261-1277. 
Appellant, a national trade association of 
insecticide, disinfectant, and an-
timicrobial product manufacturers who 
sell their products to consumer, institu-
tional, and industrial users, contended that 
the adequate warning requirements of 
Proposition 65, as applied to products 
regulated under FIFRA and FHSA, are 
preempted by those acts. 
FIFRA requires the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to register apes-
ticide before the pesticide may be used or 
sold. Also, a pesticide may not be sold 
(with certain exceptions) unless the EPA 
first determines that the product's labeling 
contains warnings and directions for use 
that are adequate to protect the public from 
fraud and personal injury and to prevent 
unreasonable adverse effects on the en-
vironment. Once the EPA has registered a 
pesticide and approved its label, the 
manufacturer may not change the label 
without the EPA's prior approval. So long 
as additional labeling is not required, 
FIFRA expressly authorizes state pes-
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ticide regulation. FHSA requires labeling 
of certain consumer products intended for 
use in the household or by children. The 
central requirement of FHSA is that 
manufacturers of hazardous products pro-
vide cautionary labels clearly indicating 
the hazards and providing consumers with 
directions for use. 
Initially, the Ninth Circuit stated that 
since the case involved a facial challenge 
to Proposition 65, appellant must establish 
that no set of circumstances exists under 
which the Act would be valid. Also, the 
court noted that in addition to there being 
a presumption against finding that state 
legislation is preempted by an act of Con-
gress, courts should be especially unlikely 
to find preemption of state laws in the 
regulation of health and safety matters, 
which are primarily and historically mat-
ters oflocal concern. The court also stated 
that to find that Proposition 65 is 
preempted under FIFRA or FHSA, all pos-
sible consumer product warnings that 
would satisfy Proposition 65 must be 
found to conflict with provisions of the 
federal statutes. One method available to 
retail outlets to comply with Proposition 
65 is by posting a sign in a visible place 
specifying the products that are known to 
the state to cause cancer or that are 
reproductively toxic. The district court 
found that such point-of-sale warnings 
constituted neither "labeling" under 
FIFRA nor "directions for use" under 
FHSA, and thus rejected appellant's 
preemption argument. 
In affirming the district court, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that additional label-
ing requirements would be unconstitu-
tional under FIFRA; however, the court 
found that the warning requirements of 
Proposition 65 do not constitute additional 
labeling. The court determined that label-
ing is generally conceived as being at-
tached to the immediate container of a 
product in such a way that it can be ex-
pected to remain affixed during the period 
of use. Because point-of-sale signs are not 
attached to the immediate container of a 
product and will not accompany the 
product during the period of use, the court 
found that the term "labeling" does not 
apply to such point-of-sale signs. 
The court also agreed that FHSA ex-
pressly preempts all state-mandated 
precautionary labeling that is not identical 
to that required by federal Act. Under 
FHSA, "all accompanying literature 
where there are directions for use, written 
or otherwise" is defined as cautionary 
labeling. However, the court found that 
Proposition 65 warnings are not "direc-
tions for use," stating that it did not believe 
Congress intended such a broad reading of 
that term. Further, the court found that 
Proposition 65 warnings are not necessari-
ly nonidentical to the warnings required 
under FHSA, noting that FHSA does not 
require any specific language in its warn-
ings and merely requires ( l) that labels 
contain the signal word "WARNING" or 
"CAUTION" and (2) words which 
describe the potential hazard. In support 
of its finding, the court offered the follow-
ing message with could comply with both 
Proposition 65 and FHSA: "Warning, this 
product contains materials known to the 
State of California to cause cancer." 
Meyerhoffv. U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 
958 F.2d 1498, No. 90-15263 
(Mar. 19, 1992). 
Reports by Agency's Advisory Panel 
Are Not Disclosable Under FOIA 
The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has determined that conflict of inter-
est forms filed by members of the EPA's 
Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) and 
Science Advisory Board (SAB) may be 
withheld under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. section 552. 
Pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act, 
5 U.S.C. App.4section 207(a)(l), the EPA 
requires the scientists on SAP and SAB to 
file conflict of interest reports that list their 
employment and financial interests, in-
cluding the names of corporations and 
other institutions with which they are as-
sociated or in which they have a financial 
interest. In March 1986, appellant re-
quested copies of documents concerning 
the scientists' employment and financial 
interests in the petrochemical and pes-
ticide industries and revealing the inter-
ests and sources of income without regard 
to specific amounts; appellant limited his 
request to such statements filed between 
January I, 1981 and November 27, 1985. 
In May 1988, the EPA denied appellant's 
request on the basis of FOIA exemptions 
3, 4, and 6. 
Exemption 3 of FOIA, codified at 5 
U.S.C. section 552(b)(3), provides that the 
Government may withhold information 
that is "specifically exempted from dis-
closure by statute ... provided that such 
statute (A) requires that the matters be 
withheld from the public in such a manner 
as to leave no discretion on the issue, or 
(B) establishes particular criteria for with-
holding or refers to particular types of 
matters to be withheld." The Ninth Circuit 
explained that in applying Exemption 3 to 
the facts of the case at issue, it must inquire 
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(I) whether the Ethics in Government 
qualifies as an Exemption 3 withholding 
statute under either Part A or B of section 
552(b)(3), and (2) whether the informa-
tion withheld falls within the scope of the 
Ethics in Government Act. 
Initially, the court found that the pre-
1985 section 207(a) of the Ethics in 
Government Act provided that the Presi-
dent may require officers and employees 
in the executive branch not covered by 
sections 201-211 of the Act to submit 
confidential reports. Further, the pre-1985 
version of section 207(a) specifically ex-
empted the reports filed under that section 
from the Ethics Act's public disclosure 
requirements in sections 205(a), (b), and 
(d). Thus, the court found that this section 
did not leave discretion to the EPA to 
disclose to the public the confidential 
reports filed by SAP and SAB members. 
Next, the court addressed Appellant's 
contention that, even if the Ethics Act is a 
withholding statute, it does not apply to 
the information sought. Appellant argued 
that the information sought was provided 
pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 11222, 
which required that "[e]ach agency shall, 
at the time of employment of a consultant, 
adviser, or other special Government 
employee require him to supply it with a 
statement of all other employment. .. .In 
addition, it shall list such other financial 
information as the appointment depart-
ment or agency shall decide is relevant in 
the light of the duties the appointee is to 
perform." Appellant further contended 
that the President had no authority under 
E.O. 11222 to obtain information that was 
not available to the public. However, the 
Ninth Circuit found that the President had 
the authority, under section 207 of the 
Ethics Act, to obtain information from 
SAP and SAB members which would not 
be publicly disclosed. 
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 
Wilson v. Eu, 
I Cal.4th 707, No. S022835 
(Jan. 27, 1992). 
Court Adopts Reapportionment Plan 
Recommended by Special Masters 
On January 27, the California Supreme 
Court adopted nearly all of the redistrict-
ing recommendations proposed by the 
Special Masters on Reapportionment, ap-
pointed by the court to draft reapportion-
ment plans for the state's legislative, con-
gressional, and Board of Equalization dis-
tricts. [12:1 CRLR 197]The court ignored 
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comments from various minority or-
ganizations, such as the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored 
People, the Congress of Racial Equality, 
and the Mexican American Legal Defense 
and Educational Fund, which contended 
that revisions to the proposed plan were 
necessary in order to provide ethnic 
minorities with fair representation. The 
only concession made by the court was to 
modify two Assembly districts in South 
Central Los Angeles to increase Asian 
population in one district and avoid split-
ting the city of Torrance. 
The new redistricting plan is viewed by 
many as extremely favorable to 
Republican interests, to the detriment of 
most other political parties and interests, 
and is expected to give Republicans a 
chance to control at least one house of the 
state legislature for the first time since 
1970. Justice Stanley Mosk, the lone dis-
senter, sharply criticized the majority's 
adoption of the plan, stating that it "unfair-
ly benefits Republicans" and improperly 
imposes "racial quotas." 
On February 28, the U.S. Department 
of Justice approved the reapportionment 
plan, finding that it complies with the 
federal Voting Rights Act. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange 
v. Superior Court, 
2 Cal.4th 377, No. S016912 
(Apr. 6, 1992). 
Judicial Proceedings Are Stayed 
Pending Administrative Action 
The California Supreme Court has 
rebuffed a 1990 attempt by former Attor-
ney General John Van de Kamp to force 
insurers into offering "good driver dis-
counts" as required by Proposition 103. 
Frustrated at then-Insurance Commis-
sioner Gillespie's failure to implement the 
initiative, Van de Kamp's office filed suit 
against Farmers, charging it (in part) with 
a violation of the unfair business practices 
act for its refusal to offer 20% good driver 
discounts as required by Proposition 103. 
Farmers demurred, claiming the state 
should exhaust its administrative 
remedies through the Department of In-
surance (DOI). Although both the trial 
court and the court of appeal overruled the 
demurrer to the unfair business practices 
claim, the California Supreme Court 
reversed. Writing for the 6-1 majority, 
Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas stayed the 
case, relying on the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine developed in the federal courts 
and not the exhaustion doctrine argued by 
The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol.12, Nos. 2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 1992) 
* 
the insurer. Justice Mosk dissented, noting 
that the primary jurisdiction doctrine does 
not and never has existed in California, 
and that DOI is "understaffed and over-
burdened with litigation relating to 
Proposition 103," such that the Attorney 




California Labor Federation AFL-
CIO v. California Occupational 
Safety and Health Standards Board, 
5 Cal.App.4th 985, No. A048574 
(Apr. 24, 1992). 
Budget Act's Attorney Fee Cap 
Violates Single Subject Rule 
In the underlying action, the trial court 
awarded petitioners $114,266.25 in 
attorneys' fees pursuant to Code of Civil 
Procedure section 1021.5 (the private at-
torney general fee doctrine) and $2,820.30 
in costs. When petitioners sought pay-
ment, respondent contended that the state 
had established-as part of the Budget 
Acts of 1990 and 1991-a $125 cap on the 
hourly fee payable for attorneys' fees 
awarded pursuant to section 1021.5; on 
that basis, the state was willing to pay only 
$55,422.75 of the attorneys' fee award. In 
this case, petitioners challenged that ac-
tion on the basis that the budget provisions 
on which the state relied are void because 
they effect an amendment of existing law 
in violation of the article IV, section 9 of 
the California Constitution (the "single 
subject rule"), which requires that every 
statute "embrace but one subject, which 
shall be expressed in its title." 
The First District Court of Appeal 
determined that the "subject" of the 
Budget Act is the appropriation of funds 
for government operations, and it cannot 
constitutionally be employed to expand a 
state agency's authority, or to substantive-
ly amend and change existing statutory 
law. Whether it effects an amendment of 
existing law for purposes of this prohibi-
tion is determined by an examination and 
comparison of its provisions with existing 
law. "If its aim is to clarify or correct 
uncertainties which arose from the enfor-
cement of the existing law, or to reach 
situations which were not covered by the 
original statute, the act is amendatory, 
even though in its wording it does not 
purport to amend the language of the prior 
act." 
The Budget Act provisions in question 
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place a cap of $125 per hour on fee award 
payments and condition payment on ac-
ceptance of this amount in "full and final 
satisfaction" of the fee claim. Comparing 
these provisions to existing law, the court 
noted that although section 102 l.5 con-
tains no express limitation on the size of 
the award, it has been universally under-
stood to permit a "reasonable" award in 
light of factors derived from the statute's 
history and purpose. According to the 
court, the limitation to a reasonable fee is 
so inherent and essential to section 1021.5 
that it must be considered necessarily im-
plied, noting that the "statute limits fee 
awards to a 'reasonable' sum as surely as 
if it said so." Because the budget 
provisions purport to impose a different 
limitation, the court determined that they 
seek to effect an outright alteration of sec-
tion 1021.5. Further, if section 1021.5 is 
viewed as ambiguous with respect to the 
amount of fees allowed, the court stated 
that the Budget Act provisions are still 
amendatory in that they purport to super-
sede the judicial resolution of that am-
biguity with a legislative "clarification" 
set forth as an appropriation. The court 
concluded that although the legislature 
may limit attorneys' fees awards under 
section 1021.5, it may not "grant a sub-
stantive right to fees, as it has done in 
section 1021.5, and then retract or impair 
the right thus granted through amend-
men ts masquerading as Budget Act 
provisions. To hold otherwise would deny 
the people the legislative accountability 
they sought to secure by adopting article 
IV, section 9. The provisions under 
scrutiny violate the single subject rule and 
are void." 
Finally, the court rejected respondent's 
contention that, whether or not the budget 
provisions are void, the court may not 
direct payment of the full award because 
to do so would infringe legislative 
prerogatives and transgress the separation 
of powers doctrine. The First District ex-
plained that although the separation of 
powers doctrine has generally been 
viewed as prohibiting a court from direct-
ly ordering the legislature to enact a 
specific appropriation, it is equally well 
established that once funds have already 
been appropriated by legislative action, a 
court transgresses no constitutional prin-
ciple when it orders the state controller or 
other similar official to make appropriate 
expenditures from such funds. 
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Ingredient Communication Council 
Inc. v. Lungren, 
2 Cal.App.4th 1480, No. C007628 
(Jan. 28, 1992). 
Phone Information System Fails to Warn 
Adequately of Products' Toxic Dangers 
In this proceeding, the Third District 
Court of Appeal reviewed the consumer 
notification and warning program of the 
Ingredient Communication Council, Inc. 
(ICC), a nonprofit membership corpora-
tion consisting of 37 manufacturers, 
retailers, and agricultural producers in-
vo Jved in marketing thousands of 
products in retail stores in California 
which may be subject to regulation pur-
suant to Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking 
Water and Toxics Enforcement Act of 
1986. Proposition 65 requires that no per-
son in the course of doing business shall 
knowingly and intentionally expose any 
individual to a chemical known to the state 
to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity 
without first giving clear and reasonable 
warning to such individual. 
In 1988, the state Health and Welfare 
Agency-the lead agency responsible for 
implementing Proposition 65-adopted 
section 1260 I ( a), Title 22 of the California 
Code of Regulations (CCR), which states 
that "[w]henever a clear and reasonable 
warning is required ... , the method 
employed to transmit the warning must be 
reasonably calculated, considering the al-
ternative methods available under the cir-
cumstances, to make the warning message 
available to the individual prior to ex-
posure. The message must clearly com-
municate that the chemical in question is 
known to the state to cause cancer, or birth 
defects or other reproductive harm .... " 
Further, section 1260l(b) of the CCR 
provides that warnings for consumer 
products exposures which include one or 
more of the following methods of trans-
mission and the warning messages 
specified by section 12601 (b) shall be 
deemed to be clear and reasonable: (1) a 
warning that appears on a product's label 
or other labeling; (2) identification, 
through shelf labeling, signs, menus, or a 
combination thereof, of the product at the 
retail outlet in a manner which provides a 
warning; or (3) a system of signs, public 
advertising identifying the system, and 
toll-free telephone information services 
that provides clear and reasonable warn-
ings. 
The system implemented by ICC in-
cluded (I) an 8-1/2 by I I-inch sign that 
adhered to the glass on the entrance of 
participating retail stores, and which con-
tained a toll-free telephone number by 
which consumers could obtain informa-
tion about products containing chemicals 
known to the state to cause cancer or other 
reproductive harm or birth defects; (2) a 
newspaper advertisement campaign in 
which a "clip and save" quarter-page ad 
was run on a regular basis in 105 daily 
newspapers, providing the toll-free num-
ber; and (3) the toll-free 800 telephone line 
itself, through which consumers could lis-
ten to taped messages regarding specific 
products. Between 7 ,000-8,000 products 
were registered in the ICC warning sys-
tem. Although ICC's system was designed 
to handle up to one million calls per year, 
only about 26,000 calls reached the toll-
free number in the first year of operation; 
in response to those calls, only 488 warn-
ing messages were played. 
The trial court declared the ICC warn-
ing system invalid for failure to give clear 
and reasonable warning. On appeal, the 
Third District noted that section 12601 (b) 
specifies certain warning method systems 
which are considered "safe harbor"-
compliance with such systems is deemed 
to provide clear and reasonable notice. 
However, section 1260l(b) requires that 
the toll-free information services-based 
system independently meet the clear and 
reasonable standard. As such, the Third 
District found that the ICC system must be 
evaluated on its specific facts just as any 
other non-safe harbor method of warning, 
and noted that the system as a whole is 
adequate only if it gives clear and 
reasonable warnings. The Third District 
found substantial evidence in the record 
supporting the trial court's finding that the 
ICC system failed to provide clear and 
reasonable warnings, stating that the fact 
that, during its first year of operation, the 
system provided only 488 taped telephone 
warning messages to California con-
sumers was sufficient in itself to support 
an inference that the system failed to make 
warnings available to consumers in any 
meaningful sense. Further, the court found 
that the ICC warning system "is also 
flawed by the sparseness and incon-
spicuousness of its in-store signs and in-
frequent newspaper advertisements, 
neither of which mention specific 
products requiring warnings." 
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Williams v. Superior Court 
(Daily Press Division of 
Freedom Newspapers, Inc.), 
3 Cal.App.4th 1292, No. E009855 
(Feb. 25, 1992). 
Public Disclosure Exemption is Qualified 
For Law Enforcement Investigatory Files 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal 
has determined that law enforcement in-
vestigatory records and files enjoy only a 
qualified exemption from the California 
Public Records Act, Government Code 
section 6250 et seq. The Daily Press 
Division of Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 
Real Party In Interest, sought to obtain 
various reports, files, and investigatory 
records from the office of petitioner Dick 
Williams, Sheriff of San Bernardino 
County. In response to Williams' claim 
that the documents being sought were ex-
empt from public disclosure pursuant to 
Government Code section 6254(f), the 
trial court conducted an in camera inspec-
tion of the subject documents; section 
6254(f) provides that (1) records of com-
plaints to, or investigations conducted by, 
or records of intelligence information or 
security procedures of the office of the 
Attorney General, the Department of Jus-
tice, and any state or local police agency, 
and (2) any investigatory or security files 
compiled by any other state or local police 
agency or any other state or local agency 
for correctional, law enforcement, or 
licensing purposes, are exempt from 
public disclosure. Following its review of 
the documents, the trial court ordered cer-
tain documents disclosed, declared certain 
documents exempt, and ordered certain 
documents disclosed only after particular, 
otherwise protected information, was 
redacted therefrom. Williams petitioned 
the Fourth District for a writ of man-
date/prohibition ordering the trial court to 
vacate its disclosure order on the basis that 
the documents in question have an ab-
solute exemption from disclosure under 
section 6254(f). 
The Fourth District found that section 
6254(f)'s disclosure exemption for law 
enforcement investigatory files is a 
qualified exemption which acknowledges 
the reality that such files may (and almost 
undoubtedly do) contain a variety of docu-
ments-some of which are subject to their 
own independent grounds for disclosure 
exemption and some of which are exempt 
from disclosure only because they have 
been placed in an investigatory or security 
file compiled by an appropriate agency for 
correctional, law enforcement, or licens-
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ing purposes; documents of the latter sort, 
noted the Fourth District, are not exempt 
from public disclosure unless they relate 
to a "concrete and definite" prospect of 
law enforcement proceedings. 
Regarding law enforcement inves-
tigatory records, the court stated that ap-
p lic ab le caselaw reveals a general 
guideline that information in such records 
is exempt from public disclosure only to 
the extent that disclosure of the informa-
tion would interfere with enforcement 
proceedings; deprive a person of a right to 
a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy; disclose the identity of a 
confidential source and, in the case of a 
record compiled by a criminal law enfor-
cement authority in the course of a 
criminal investigation, confidential infor-
mation furnished only by the confidential 
source; disclose investigative techniques 
and procedures; or endanger the life or 
physical safety of law enforcement per-
sonnel. The Fourth District remanded the 
matter to the trial court, stating that these 
criteria should be applied in deciding 
whether particular law enforcement inves-
tigatory records are exempt under section 
6254(f). 
Claypool v. Wilson, 
4 Cal.App.4th 646, No. COi 1580 
(Mar. 12, 1992). 
Changes in State Pension Fund Uses 
Arise From Legally Valid Statutes 
In this original mandamus proceeding, 
members of the Public Employees' Retire-
ment System (PERS) and their employee 
organizations challenged the con-
stitutionality of two parts of Chapter 83, 
Statutes of 1991. One part repeals three 
funded supplemental cost of living 
(COLA) programs and directs that the 
funds be used to offset contributions 
otherwise due from PERS employers; the 
other transfers the responsibility for ac-
tuarial determinations from the PERS 
Board to an actuary acting under a contract 
with the Governor. Petitioners contended 
that the repeal of the supplemental COLA 
programs and reallocation of the funds to 
offset employer contributions unconstitu-
tionally impair the contract rights of PERS 
beneficiaries and, along with the transfer 
of actuarial functions, violate California 
Constitution, article XVI, section 17, 
which declares that the assets of a public 
pension or retirement system are trust 
funds. 
The court initially determined that 
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only persons employed after January 1, 
1989, could have vested rights to the 
former COLA benefits which were 
eliminated by Chapter 83, since prior to 
that time supplemental COLA programs 
were subject to expiration by sunset 
provisions. Regarding those employees, 
the court stated that under California law, 
an employee's vested contractual pension 
rights may be modified prior to retirement 
provided that the modifications are 
reasonable; such a modification is 
reasonable only if it bears some material 
relation to the theory of a pension system 
and its successful operation, and changes 
in it which result in disadvantage to 
employees are accompanied by com-
parable new advantages. According to 
Governor Wilson, the changes provide a 
more certain source of long-term funding 
for supplemental COLA benefits as well 
as helping to alleviate the state budget 
deficit; further, Governor Wilson 
presented evidence showing that the 
projected new benefits are likely to be 
equivalent to or greater than those avail-
able under the former program. After 
reviewing the projections, the court 
agreed that the modifications to the retire-
ment system were reasonable. 
The court similarly rejected 
petitioners' claims that the use of former 
supplemental COLA funds to reduce the 
state's employer contributions otherwise 
required impairs employees' funding 
rights and unconstitutionally invades the 
PERS trust. Among other things, the court 
determined that the use of the funds to 
meet the employers' continuing funding 
obligation is no more proscribed by the 
state constitution than is the use of earn-
ings attributable to the employer accounts 
of the PERS fund for the same purpose. 
Finally, the court found that the 
Governor's appointment of an actuary 
does not present an intolerable conflict of 
interest, stating that the safeguards 
enacted in Government Code section 
20006 sufficiently insulate the actuary 
from control by the Governor so as to 
permit the actuary to function as a 
fiduciary. 
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